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Abstract It is well documented that in the United States, real estate
investment trust (REIT) initial public offerings (IPOs) have an
abnormally low initial-day return when compared to that of
industrial ﬁrm IPOs. Researchers suspect that the abnormal
return pattern of REIT IPOs is caused by their unique real estate
holdings. Examination of 399 IPOs issued in Hong Kong during
the 1986–1997 period reveals strong evidence that suggests that
underlying real estate holdings cannot be the sole reason for the
observed low initial-day return of REIT IPOs. This investigation
indicates that there is a need to re-think the current explanations
for the abnormal performance of REIT IPOs.
Introduction
One of the most puzzling phenomena in the ﬁnance literature is the pricing
behavior of initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity securities. In the United States,
investors who participate in the IPOs of industrial ﬁrms earn about a 16% gain
during the ﬁrst trading day, on average. This ﬁrst trading day return is even higher
in some other countries. Just as puzzling is the fact that the IPO ﬁrms tend to
underperform the market for a period of up to three years. These empirical
regularities lead to two important questions. First, why do the original (non-public)
equityholders offer new shares that are consistently underpriced? If the shares had
been priced ‘‘rationally,’’ the original equityholders would have had 16% more
capital after the ﬁrst trading day. Second, why do IPO ﬁrms underperform the
market over the longer-run, given that the initial prospects seem so positive?
While various answers to these questions have been suggested, they can be
grouped into two types of explanations. The ﬁrst group of explanations are variants
of the ‘‘winner’s curse’’ theory, according to which underwriters rationally price
IPOs below their market value in order to achieve an economic equilibrium. The
second group includes the ‘‘fad’’ or ‘‘hot market’’ theories, which simply state
that those who purchase shares on the ﬁrst day of trading of the IPO stocks pay
too much for the shares. From this perspective, the price run-up during the ﬁrst
trading day is not rational, while the longer-run price decline restores rationality.1
Although empirical evidence exists to support both types of explanations, it is
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spite of the spectacular initial-day return for industrial ﬁrm IPOs, there is also
anomalous evidence from the IPOs for real estate investment trusts (REITs),
master limited partnerships (MLPs) and closed-end mutual funds. The IPOs of
those units tend either to be overpriced or at least signiﬁcantly less underpriced
than the typical industrial ﬁrm IPOs.
Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) report that REIT IPOs from 1971 to 1988 were
overpriced, while Weiss (1989) and Peavy (1990) show that IPOs of closed-end
funds are not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) extend
Wang, Chan and Gau’s study to a more recent period, ﬁnding that REIT IPOs
issued in the 1990s have a positive and signiﬁcant average initial-day return.
However, this return is extremely small when compared to industrial ﬁrm IPOs.
In addition, Muscarella (1988) and Michaely and Shaw (1994) also ﬁnd that MLP
IPOs (including real estate related IPOs) are not as signiﬁcantly underpriced as
industrial ﬁrm IPOs. The evidence derived from IPOs of mutual funds, REITs and
MLPs casts some doubt on the completeness of the existing theories of IPO
underpricing as an equilibrium phenomenon.
To address this puzzle, Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) suggest that REIT IPOs may
behave differently from industrial ﬁrm IPOs for three reasons. First, REITs, at
least in the pre-1990s, have more uninformed investors subscribing to the IPOs
when compared to industrial ﬁrms; a characteristic also true for mutual fund and
MLP IPOs. Second, REITs during the pre-1990s were not operating companies.
Given this, REIT IPOs should behave similarly to mutual fund IPOs. Third, REITs
hold special assets (real properties and mortgages). In other words, since there is
evidence that the return-risk relationship of real estate investments is different
from stocks in general, real estate holdings may produce the difference in IPO
performance. To summarize, the lack of information about the ﬁrm (due to the
low participation from institutional investors), the non-operating characteristics of
the trust and the underlying real estate asset may make REITs, real estate MLPs
and mutual funds behave differently from other industrial ﬁrms.
While the proportion of uniformed investors in the REIT IPO market appears to
be a factor prior to 1990, REIT IPOs in the 1990s were still signiﬁcantly less
underpriced than industrial ﬁrm IPOs (see Wang, Chan, Gau, 1992; and Ling and
Ryngaert, 1997). Since Chan, Leung and Wang (1998) report that the institutional
involvement in REIT IPOs after 1990 is as high as that for other stocks in the
market (and is much higher than the institutional holding level of REIT IPOs
before 1990), it appears that the institutional-investor (and information-related)
explanation does not fully explain the initial price performance of REIT IPOs.
Given the observation that mutual fund IPOs are not underpriced, it is reasonable
for us to suspect that REIT IPOs may also be affected by their fund-like structure
(as non-operating ﬁrms). However, REITs and mutual funds are distinct in at least
one crucial respect. Since a mutual fund holds stocks that are traded on stock
exchanges, there is no uncertainty about the value of those funds. In contrast,Are Real Estate IPOs a Different Species?  203
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there is uncertainty about the value of REITs, because the values of the underlying
assets are in general unknown. Given this important difference, it is not apparent
that REIT IPOs should behave the same as mutual fund IPOs.
REITs behaved more like operating companies after 1990. Yet even after the
change, the pricing behavior of their IPOs is still signiﬁcantly different from that
of industrial ﬁrms. Apparently, the change in the fund-like structure alone cannot
explain why REIT IPOs are not as underpriced as industrial ﬁrm IPOs.
Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates that MLP IPOs are also not signiﬁcantly
underpriced. Given the fact that MLPs are operating companies, the fund-like
structure should not be the only factor that affects REIT IPO behavior. In other
words, while the fund-like structure is a possible cause, the available evidence to
support or to dispute this assertion is weak.
The last possible explanation to be explored is whether a REIT’s underlying real
estate assets produce the anomalous behavior of REIT IPOs. This article examines
this important issue. This is accomplished by analyzing 56 real estate related IPOs
in comparison to 343 non-real estate IPOs in Hong Kong during the 1986–1997
period. Hong Kong property ﬁrms (real estate related) have a considerable
presence in the Hong Kong ﬁnancial market. As operating companies, they
manage signiﬁcant property holdings. With the Hong Kong sample, the fund-like
structure explanation of IPO pricing is not an issue, because all ﬁrms are operating
companies. In addition, the informational problem faced by uninformed REIT
investors in the U.S. is not relevant in the current context, because most Hong
Kong property companies are heavily traded. As a result, the use of the Hong
Kong IPO sample allows us to focus the analysis on whether real estate holdings
explain the observed REIT IPO price behavior.
Results indicate that Hong Kong IPOs, both real estate related and non-real estate,
are signiﬁcantly underpriced at roughly the same degree as U.S. industrial ﬁrm
IPOs. Furthermore, given this evidence, we conclude that the underlying assets of
ﬁrms do not directly cause a difference in the IPO valuation. The puzzle
concerning the difference in behavior between REIT and typical industrial ﬁrm
IPOs therefore remains unsolved. Since the current analysis excludes the
possibility that real estate holdings can explain REIT IPO price behavior, this
evidence suggests that the impact of the fund-like structure on REIT IPOs should
be re-examined. This seems to be the only explanation that has not been
eliminated.
This article is organized as follows. Next, the institutional features of the IPO
market in Hong Kong are examined and an explanation is given of why the Hong
Kong IPO market is suitable for analyzing real estate IPO pricing behavior. Next,
the methodology and univariate results are presented, followed by an explanation
of the multivariate (regression) results for the initial-day returns. The long-run
performance of the Hong Kong IPOs is then considered. Finally, the concluding
comments are presented.204  Chan, Stohs and Wang
 Hong Kong IPO Market as a Laboratory
Hong Kong provides an ideal environment for examining the price behavior of
real estate IPOs for two reasons. First, real estate companies comprise a signiﬁcant
portion of the total market capitalization in the Hong Kong stock market. Exhibit
1 reports the market capitalization of Hong Kong ﬁrms by industry classiﬁcation
during the 1995–1999 period. Panel A indicates that the market capitalization of
property and hotel stocks is HK $813,478 million (US $104.6 billion) in 1999.
This market capitalization is not much below the total market value of REITs
traded in U.S. stock exchanges. Panel B indicates that, during the 1995–1999
period, property and hotel stocks on average account for 24.79% of the total
market capitalization of the Hong Kong stock market.
Exhibit 2 reports the turnover of equity securities in Hong Kong, classiﬁed by
industry during 1999. The exhibit shows that around 42.64% of property stocks
exchanged hands in 1999. As a comparison, only 37.51% of stocks traded on the
Hong Kong stock exchange changed hands during the same year. This indicates
that investors pay at least as much attention to property stocks as they do to other
equity securities. Further, the 1999 Hong Kong Stock Exchange Fact Book reports
that ﬁve out of the top twelve most active stocks (in terms of turnover trading
value) on the exchange are property stocks.
In contrast to the attention that property stocks receive in Hong Kong, REITs in
the U.S. receive much less attention from investors (especially institutional
investors), at least prior to 1995. Consequently, by using Hong Kong data to study
real estate IPOs, there is no concern about the uninformed investor explanation
that must be addressed by REIT IPOs studies.
Second, all real estate companies in Hong Kong are operating companies. Some
of them are in the development business. However, even for the development
companies, Lai and Wang (1999) report that such ﬁrms have signiﬁcant property
holdings as investment vehicles. In this regard, the price behavior of those stocks
should also reﬂect their underlying real assets. Consequently, the use of Hong
Kong IPOs allows us to examine the price behavior of real estate IPO without the
inﬂuence of the fund-like structure (as in REIT IPOs).
 Sample Design and Univariate Results
The initial sample consists of all IPOs listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong (SEHK) from 1986 to 1997.2 The sample period, 1986–1997, is important
for Hong Kong because it follows the consolidation of the four previous equity
markets in Hong Kong into the SEHK on April 2, 1986. This consolidation plus
a vibrant economy contributed to a dramatic increase in the number of IPOs in
Hong Kong, from only 4 IPOs during 1975–1979, to 35 IPOs during 1980–1985
(see McGuiness, 1992), increasing to an average of almost 50 per year during the
1991–1997 period.3Are Real Estate IPOs a Different Species?  205
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Properties 112 329,809 18.60 42.64
Hotels 14 6,541 0.37 16.36
Finance 52 297,376 16.77 24.29
Utilities 14 228,774 12.90 20.20
Consolidated enterprises 220 545,176 30.75 46.57
Industrials 289 344,958 19.45 91.37
Miscellaneous 9 20,542 1.16 223.98
Total 710 1,773,176 100.00 37.51
Notes: The data is obtained from the Stock Exchange Fact Book, 1999, published by the Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong.
aTurnover in warrants, and unit trusts are not included.
bTurnover values have been adjusted for late reported and rejected sales.
cAnnual turnover velocity is computed using the trading value (in column 3) divided by the
corresponding year-end equity market capitalization for 1999 (given in Exhibit 1).
Data from the annual editions of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Fact Books and
the Securities Database Corporation (SDC) Platinum New Issues database is used
to identify the sample of Hong Kong IPOs for the 1986–1997 period. The
information from these two sources includes the name of the offering ﬁrm, the
date of the offer, the lead manager, the number of shares offered and the offer
price.4 The SDC New Issues database also provides the industry classiﬁcation of
the offering ﬁrms. The PACAP Database (from the Paciﬁc-Basic Capital Markets
Research Center) is used to determine the after-market closing price and the long-
run returns of these IPOs as well as the returns on the market (Hang Seng) index.
These data requirements restrict the sample size, such that the ﬁnal sample consists
of a total of 399 IPOs, with 56 real estate related and 343 non-real estate related
IPOs during the 1986–1997 period. The effect of the data restrictions is minimal
however. For example, the Stock Exchange Fact Book lists 24, 44 and 79 IPOs
that are offered for public subscriptions during the 1995–1997 period, while the
sample includes 23, 44 and 74 IPOs, over 95% of the total IPOs during these
years.
Exhibit 3 reports the annual number of all Hong Kong IPOs in the sample (both
real estate related and non-real estate). Interestingly, the number of offerings
moves quite closely with the Hang Seng Index during the 1986–1997 period.Are Real Estate IPOs a Different Species?  207
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Exhibit 3  Annual Distribution of the Number of Offerings, Average Initial-day Raw Returns and Gross








Panel A: Real estate related
1986 1 14.41 118
1987 1 0.78 273
1988 0 na na 0
1989 1 2.00 1,219
1990 2 34.37 0.71 127
1991 6 12.08 1.95 647
1992 7 15.35* 2.57 2,008
1993 7 12.55* 3.07 3,004
1994 2 3.00 3.00 405
1995 3 6.90 1.34 2,226
1996 8 10.56 1.10 12,898
1997 18 24.81 1.27 16,159
Total 56 16.21* 2.47 39,084
1986–89 3 4.40 0.87 1,610
1990–93 22 15.30* 3.50 5,786
1994–97 31 18.00 1.56 31,688
Panel B: Non-real estate
1986 5 1.36 0.13 2,953
1987 17 29.68* 3.14 2,546
1988 18 18.31* 4.81 1,220
1989 7 6.34 1.07 1,723
1990 9 9.43** 1.85 1,854
1991 42 14.08** 1.93 4,979
1992 47 18.06 3.02 7,324
1993 49 36.63* 7.03 15,317
1994 37 7.35 1.41 6,112
1995 20 3.14 0.45 4,970
1996 36 14.65* 2.43 18,225
1997 56 27.89* 3.71 24,270
Total 343 18.96* 8.50 91,493
1986–89 47 18.84* 4.54 8,442
1990–93 147 22.58* 6.62 29,474
1994–97 149 15.43* 4.23 53,576
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level for a two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 10% level for a two-tailed test.208  Chan, Stohs and Wang
Although the observation period is only twelve years, the correlation between the
total number of IPOs in a year and the Hang Seng Index (at the mid-point of the
year) is 0.75; while the correlation between the number of real estate IPOs and
the number of non-real estate IPOs per year during this same period is 0.79.
Clearly, market sentiment is important to IPO issuance in Hong Kong and there
is preliminary evidence that a ‘‘hot market’’ might affect the price behavior of
real estate and non-real estate IPOs.
Initial-Day Return
Exhibit 3 also reports the average initial-day return of real estate IPOs (Panel A)
and non-real estate IPOs (Panel B) for each year during the 1986–1997 period.
The returns of those IPOs are also partitioned into three four-year subperiods:
1986–1989, 1990–1993 and 1994–1997. Given the relatively small number of
real estate related IPOs in each year, it is perhaps surprising that two (1992–1993)
of the eight years (1990–1997) with multiple IPOs show a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant initial-day return. The initial-day returns, while positive, are not
statistically different from zero during the last four sample years of 1994 to 1997.
The partitioning of the real estate sample into four-year periods highlights the
pattern of initial-day returns from the year-by-year analysis. For the 1990–1993
period, real estate IPOs are underpriced by a statistically signiﬁcant 15.3%. During
the most recent period of 1994–1997, the mean underpricing of 18% is not
statistically different from zero. Nonetheless, the average initial-day return for all
56 real estate related IPOs is a statistically signiﬁcant 16.21%. This underpricing
is equivalent to the average underpricing of 16% for industrial ﬁrms in the U.S.
The pattern of underpricing across years for non-real estate IPOs is similar to that
for the real estate IPOs, in that both the real estate and the non-real estate samples
have returns for 1994 and 1995 that are not statistically different from zero. The
year 1995 marked the bottom of a bear market for the Hang Seng Index, which
fell from a high of 12,158 in early 1994 to a low of 7,297 in mid 1995, a drop
of 40%. The average underpricing during the whole sample period for the non-
real estate sample is a statistically signiﬁcant 18.96%, a level of underpricing
roughly equal to that in the U.S. for the typical industrial ﬁrm. The comparison
indicates that real estate related IPOs perform about the same as non-real estate
IPOs on the initial trading day.
The Impact of Business Concentration
Based on the business description of the offering ﬁrms provided in the SDC
Platinum New Issues database, the real estate related IPOs are further classiﬁed
into: (1) 26 real estate (or property) IPOs; (2) 23 construction IPOs; and (3) 7
hotel IPOs. Exhibit 4 provides descriptive statistics about the average funds raised
by the real estate related and non-real estate IPOs.Are Real Estate IPOs a Different Species?  209
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Exhibit 4  Summary Statistics for Hong Kong IPO Funds Raised (in HK $000s)
Classiﬁed by Industry during 1986–1997
Sample
Average Funds
Raised ($) Std. Dev. ($) Min. ($) Max. ($)
Sample
Size
Real estate related 697,920 954,580 25,000 4,326,300 56
Real estate 544,411 599,333 37,741 2,794,340 26
Construction 955,442 1,300,631 25,000 4,326,300 23
Hotels 421,950 456,817 48,640 1,219,270 7
Non-real estate 266,745 549,608 10,500 5,937,500 343
Exhibit 5  Summary Statistics for the Initial-day Raw Returns for Hong Kong Real Estate Related and







Size #  0#  0#  0 Median Min. Max.
Real estate related 16.21* 2.47 56 14 0 42 4.60 39.50 317.14
Subcategorized by:
Real Estate 27.81** 2.04 26 7 0 19 4.33 39.50 317.14
Construction 3.01 1.15 23 6 0 17 2.00 19.39 29.55
Hotels 16.46* 2.84 7 1 0 6 14.41 2.00 42.50
Non-real estate 18.96* 8.50 343 87 5 251 9.00 77.39 293.33
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level for a two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 10% level for a two-tailed test.
An examination of Exhibit 4 reveals two interesting observations. First, the
average funds raised of $698M by the 56 real estate related IPOs is more than
double that of the $267M average for 343 non-real estate IPOs. This pattern is
very similar to the U.S., where the average IPO size is much larger for REIT IPOs
than for industrial ﬁrm IPOs. Second, the average funds raised within the real
estate related IPOs differs dramatically. The 23 construction IPOs raised an
average $955M, which is much larger than the funds raised by the 26 real estate
IPOs (at $544M raised on average) and the seven hotel IPOs (at $422M raised).
Exhibit 5 displays the initial-day returns along with the number of IPOs with
returns less than, equal to and greater than zero for all real estate related IPOs210  Chan, Stohs and Wang
and the three sub-groups of real estate as well as for non-real estate IPOs. This
exhibit highlights the differences in the mean initial-day returns among the three
types of real estate IPOs. Real estate IPOs and hotel IPOs both have positive and
signiﬁcant mean initial-day returns. The mean initial-day return (27.81%) of real
estate IPOs is affected by one outlier (an initial-day return of 317.14%). After the
removal of this outlier, the mean initial-day return of real estate IPOs is consistent
with the IPOs in the general stock market.
The 23 construction IPOs experience only an insigniﬁcant 3.01% initial-day return
and this gain is not statistically different from zero. Since construction (real estate)
ﬁrms should exhibit more operating characteristics than other real estate ﬁrms, the
initial-day return of construction (real estate) IPOs should be greater if the fund-
like structure of REITs caused the REIT IPOs to behave differently from the
industrial ﬁrm IPOs. Given the evidence that the average initial-day return of
construction real estate IPOs (with more operating characteristics) is lower than
that of real estate IPOs (with more real estate holdings), we suspect that the fund-
like structure explanation alone might not be able to explain the observed low
REIT IPO initial-day returns.
The Impact of the Underwriter
Prior evidence suggests that IPOs are more underpriced when they are
underwritten by investment banks with lower prestige. Beatty and Ritter (1986)
offer the standard explanation for this behavior, which is that prestigious
underwriters maintain their reputation by ‘‘producing’’ for the ﬁrms they
underwrite. Prestigious underwriters obtain a higher offering price for the IPO, in
part by managing IPOs with a low variance of possible ﬁrm values. Stoughton
and Zechner (1998) add that having a reputation at stake also embodies a longer-
term relationship between the underwriter ﬁrm and the corporation ﬂoating the
IPO. The longer-term relationship serves to minimize agency costs of monitoring
the corporation.
There is not a standard ranking of investment banks that underwrite IPOs in Hong
Kong or Asia for the 1986–1997 period. As a result, this study follows the general
procedure of Carter and Manaster (1990) and ranks the underwriters in Hong Kong
according to the number of IPOs they undertake. The 60 lead underwriters that
underwrite IPOs in the sample are ranked according to the total number of
offerings they manage over the twelve years in the sample time period. The
ranking criteria for the Hong Kong underwriters appear in Exhibit 6, along with
the number of underwriters within a group and the total number of IPOs
undertaken by the ﬁrms within the group. Underwriters are assigned to IPOs
according to the lead underwriter. A ranking of 1 designates the highest prestige,
down to a ranking of 5, indicating the lowest prestige of the underwriters for
which there is data. Data about the underwriters for 17 IPOs was not speciﬁed in
our data source. The unknown underwriters for this group receive a ranking of 6,
indicating the lowest overall prestige.Are Real Estate IPOs a Different Species?  211
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Exhibit 6  Ranking of Underwriters in Hong Kong—1986–1997








1#  70 1 74
24 0  #  70 2 87
31 0  #  40 5 69
45  #  10 11 72
5#  54 1 8 0
6– – 1 7
Total 60 399
Note: The 60 investment banking ﬁrms that underwrite IPOs in Hong Kong are ranked according to
the total number of offerings they manage over the twelve years in the sample period. A ranking of 1
indicates the highest prestige/reputation. Data about the underwriters for 17 IPOs was not speciﬁed
in the IPO documents. The unknown underwriters for this group receive a ranking of 6.
Exhibit 7 explores the relationship between the underwriter’s reputation and the
mean initial-day return, by ranking the underwriters’ reputation on a scale of 1 to
6 (as speciﬁed in Exhibit 6). The exhibit decomposes each sub-category of IPO
into the ﬁve ranks of the underwriter’s reputation. (The information on Rank 6 is
reported only when the sample size is meaningful.) Wang, Chan and Gau (1992)
report that underwriters with the highest reputations generate the least amount of
underpricing (i.e., the lowest initial-day returns) for REIT IPOs issued in the U.S.
stock market.
Exhibit 7 reports the information on the inﬂuence of the underwriter’s reputation
on initial-day returns. It is interesting to note that Rank 2 (for both real estate
related and non-real estate) and Rank 5 (for real estate related) tend to exhibit
higher mean initial-day returns than other ranks. The two investment banks in
Rank 2 underwrite a total of 87 IPOs during the sample period, while the 37
underwriters in Rank 5 underwrite a total of 65 IPOs.
While Exhibit 7 indicates that underwriter’s reputation affects the initial-day return
of an IPO, a detailed examination of the data reveals that outliers might be the
cause of this discrepancy. The maximum return of IPO in the Rank 2 of real estate
related category is 144.32%, while the maximum return of the Rank 5 in the real
estate related category is 317.14%. If two observations are deleted, the average
initial-day returns of IPOs among the 5 ranks do not differ much. Given this
evidence, and since there is no reason to believe that the relationship between
initial-day return and underwriter’s reputation should not be monotonic, it is safe
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Hong Kong IPOs in a systematic way. This evidence contrasts with what we have
observed in the U.S. REIT stock market.
 Regression Results for the Initial-day Return
This section examines whether a multivariate analysis preserves the results of the
univariate analysis presented. Two regression models are considered. Model 1 is
a regression analysis with 5 independent variables (offering size, underwriter’s
ranking, period, market condition and real estate related). The offering size
variable is deﬁned as the market value of the initial offering (the product of the
offer price and the number of shares issued by the IPO). This variable is included
as a control variable. The natural log of this value is calculated, yielding the
regression variable, Ln(MV). A UW ranking is used to control for the inﬂuence
of the underwriter, with a UW Rank of 1 indicating the highest prestige down to
a UW rank of 6, indicating the lowest prestige (see Exhibit 6).
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) report that ﬁrms successfully time their
IPOs by issuing them when valuations are high.5 To control for this effect, the
six-month return of the Hang Seng Index (HSI Return) for each IPO is calculated
on the day of the IPO.6 This variable is the HSI Return in the regressions. A
positive relationship between the initial-day return and the HSI Return would
support the market-timing hypothesis.
Finally, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) also suggest that the reduction in
regulatory interference in East Asian countries should result in less short-run
underpricing in the 1990s than in the 1980s. To control for this potential effect,
two dummy variables are included. One dummy variable represents the subperiod
1990–1993, while the other represents subperiod 1994–1997. Negative
coefﬁcients for either of these two dummy variables would tend to support this
hypothesis (i.e., as the year progresses, markets become more competitive and
there is less underpricing).7
Central to the current study is whether real estate related IPOs have signiﬁcantly
different initial returns from non-real estate IPOs. A dummy variable is
constructed in order to test whether the pricing of real estate related IPOs in Hong
Kong is the same as that for standard non-real estate IPOs. The dummy variable
is labeled Real Estate Related, and is deﬁned as 1, if the IPO is a real estate
related IPO, and 0 otherwise. If the underlying real estate holding explains why
real estate related IPOs behave differently from other industrial IPOs, the
coefﬁcient estimate for this variable should be signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Otherwise, this coefﬁcient should not be statistically different from zero. In other
words, the coefﬁcient estimate for this variable provides critical evidence for
addressing the central question posed by this article: Are real estate IPOs a
different species? The second regression model (Model 2) estimates the same
equation except omitting the real estate related dummy variable.Are Real Estate IPOs a Different Species?  215
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Exhibit 8  Regression Results from Regressing the Raw Initial-day Return on Independent Variables for the
Hong Kong Real Estate Related and Non-real Estate Industries during 1987–1997

























Real estate related 2.11
(0.33)
Number of observations 393 393
Adj. R2 0.02 0.04
F-value 2.48* 2.96*
Notes: t-Statistics are given in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level for a two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 10% level for a two-tailed test.
aThe dependent variable in the regression is the Initial-day Return, deﬁned as the raw percentage
return for the ﬁrm’s stock on the day of the IPO. The independent variables include: Ln(MV) is the
natural log of the product of the offer price and the number of shares offered for the IPO; Real Estate
Related is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IPOs that are real estate related; UW Rank
indicates the prestige of the lead underwriter of the IPO according to an index ranging from 1 (the
highest prestige) to 6 (the lowest prestige) as displayed in Exhibit 6; HSI Return is the percentage
return of the Hang Seng Index for the 6 months leading up to the IPO; the Periods 1990–1993 and
1994–1997 are dummy variables, with the 1986–1989 period omitted.
Exhibit 8 reports the regression results for Models 1 and 2. First and most
importantly, the coefﬁcient estimate (2.11) for the Real Estate Related variable
in Model 1 is statistically insigniﬁcant, which indicates that the initial-day returns
for real estate related IPOs are not statistically different from the returns of
non-real estate IPOs. This result is different from that reported for the IPOs of
U.S. real estate MLPs and REITs. The result provides strong evidence that an IPO
with real estate holdings should not behave differently from an IPO without real
estate holdings. If this evidence is applied to the U.S. REIT market, then it is216  Chan, Stohs and Wang
clear that the abnormally low initial-day return of REIT IPOs should not be caused
by their underlying real estate holdings.
As a double check, in Model 2, a similar regression analysis is run except that
the Real Estate Related variable is omitted. The result is also displayed in Exhibit
8. After omitting the Real Estate Related variable, the coefﬁcients of all other
variables are still quite stable. Furthermore, the adjusted R2 of Model 2 (without
the Real Estate Related variable) is higher than that of Model 1 (with the Real
Estate Related variable), meaning that the inclusion of the Real Estate Related
variable in the equation does not increase its explanatory power. This analysis
provides more evidence to support the ﬁnding that real estate holdings alone do
not provide explanatory power for the initial-day return of IPOs.
Exhibit 8 also indicates that four out of the ﬁve control variables are not
signiﬁcantly different from zero. However, both models indicate that market
timing might be the most important factor determining the initial-day return. The
coefﬁcient estimates of 0.458 and 0.459 for HSI Return are statistically signiﬁcant.
This seems to indicate that market condition is the most important factor
determining the initial-day return of an IPO. While this result seems quite
interesting, there might be other (omitted) variables that drive the stock market
return, which are not speciﬁed in the regressions. Institutional or contractual
features, such as the subscription rate proposed by Chowdhry and Sherman (1996),
may be driving the impact of the stock market (HSI Return) on the initial-day
return.
 The Long-term Performance of Real Estate IPOs in Hong
Kong
In addition to the initial-day excess returns to investors, it is well known that U.S.
IPOs underperform the market in the longer run, to the extent of losing all of their
initial gains within the ﬁrst year. Do real estate related or non-real estate related
IPOs in Hong Kong also exhibit the similar characteristics as U.S. IPOs in the
long run? REIT IPOs, although not underpriced in the initial-day, also perform
poorly in the subsequent 200 trading days. Do Hong Kong real estate related IPOs
(with a strong positive initial-day return) behave differently from U.S. REIT IPOs?
This section examines these issues.
The methodology used by Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) is adopted to analyze the
long-run performance of Hong Kong IPOs. Exhibit 9 presents the market-adjusted
cumulative average daily returns (CARs) for selected intervals of up to 200 days
after the initial offering. The market-adjusted return is deﬁned as the difference
between the raw return and the return of the Hang Seng Index (the market index
of the Hong Kong stock market) of the same day. The exhibit also compares
CARs for the sample of 343 non-real estate IPOs and the sample of 56 real estate
related IPOs.Are Real Estate IPOs a Different Species?  217
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Exhibit 9  Market-adjusted Cumulative Average Daily Returns (CARs) for Selected Intervals during
the First 200 Trading Days after the IPOs of Hong Kong Real Estate Related and








































































Notes: t-Statistics are given in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level for a two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 10% level for a two-tailed test.
aThe market-adjusted CAR from day t1 to t2 is computed as the sum of the cross-sectional average
daily returns (Art) from day t1 through t2. The t-Statistic for CAR in the interval (t1, t2) is computed as
, where Nt is the number of IPOs trading during each day, and CSDt is computed CAR  N /CSD t ,tt t 12
as CSDt  . The variance (var) is the average cross-sectional (t  t  1)  var  2(t  t )  cov 21 21
variance (from day 2 to day 200) and the covariance (cov) is the ﬁrst-order autocovariance of the ARt
series. The market adjusted return is deﬁned as the difference between raw return and the HSI return
(the market index of the Hong Kong stock market) during the same day. This methodology assumes
that the measures of performance are independent and identically distributed in the cross section of
securities.
bThe sample size varies because some ﬁrms do not have price data for all 200 days after the initial
offerings.218  Chan, Stohs and Wang
Both CARs (for the real estate related and non-real estate samples) exhibit a
similar pattern that is quite like those for U.S. IPOs. That is, IPO stocks perform
worse than the market index immediately after the ﬁrst trading day. For the non-
real estate IPOs, the only statistically signiﬁcant loss of 2.06% occurs for the
2  20 day interval. This early loss, as for the REIT sample in Wang et al. (1992),
does not support Peavy’s (1990) underwriter’s support hypothesis. After 20 trading
days, the non-real estate IPOs seem to perform similarly to the market index. The
CAR for the 21  200 day interval is not signiﬁcantly different from zero,
meaning that non-real estate IPO stocks and the stock index perform roughly the
same. Indeed, the 1  200 day return of 17.52% as compared to the 1  10 day
return of 17.28% (both statistically different from zero) clearly indicates that the
average investor in a Hong Kong non-real estate IPO does not lose value. An
investor who buys and holds maintains virtually all of the initial-day gain over
the next 200 days. This result is different from that observed in the U.S. stock
market.
Finally, consider the sample of 56 real estate related ﬁrms. While the general
pattern of the CARs is similar to the non-real estate sample, one important
difference emerges. The difference is that, while real estate IPOs do not
signiﬁcantly underperform the market for all of the longer-term intervals, they
clearly do not outperform the market. The CARs for several of the intervals
indicate this difference. While the 1  10, 1  20 and 1  30 day intervals for
the real estate sample all have statistically signiﬁcant positive gains (13.67%,
11.53% and 11.05%, respectively), there is a clear pattern that investors are losing
the gains obtained during the initial trading day.
The most striking evidence is a statistically signiﬁcant 9.62% CAR for the real
estate 2  60 day interval. This drop corresponds to the 1  60 day gain of
6.64%, which is not statistically different from zero. That is, while the real estate
IPOs experience an initial-day gain of 16.21%, that gain erodes to only 6.64%
after 60 trading days following the IPO. This pattern is very similar to that of the
long run performance of U.S. REIT IPOs. However, there is still a critical
difference between U.S. REIT IPOs and Hong Kong real estate IPOs. Investors
in U.S. REIT IPOs lost money in the long-run, while investors of Hong Kong real
estate IPOs still earn a signiﬁcant positive return, at least during the ﬁrst 30-day
interval following the IPO.
 Conclusion
This article examines whether the underlying real estate holding is the main reason
for the abnormal price performance of U.S. REIT IPOs. The literature indicates
that there are three competing explanations for the abnormally low REIT initial-
day return: (1) less attention from informed investors; (2) non-operating ﬁrm (or
fund-like) structure; and (3) the underlying real estate holding. Because of the
unique characteristics of Hong Kong IPOs, the ﬁrst two competing explanations
(informed investors and non-operating ﬁrm structure) can be ruled out and theAre Real Estate IPOs a Different Species?  219
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analysis can concentrate on the third explanation (real estate holding) when Hong
Kong IPOs are used as the sample.
The results indicate that the mean initial-day return of the 56 real estate related
IPOs is 16.21%, which is comparable to 18.96% for the 343 non-real estate IPOs
in the sample. These returns are also consistent with the average 16% initial-day
return for U.S. operating ﬁrm IPOs. The results provide strong evidence that
suggests that the underlying real estate holding alone does not explain the
observed low initial-day returns for U.S. REIT IPOs.
However, the puzzle remains. Why do REIT IPOs behave so differently from
industrial ﬁrm IPOs? It is not due to real estate or to uninformed investors. Some
ad hoc evidence indicates that the fund-like structure may not be the explanation
either. Since none of the current three explanations are supported by empirical
evidence, the article clearly indicates a need to rethink the explanations for the
abnormally low initial-day returns of U.S. REIT IPOs.
 Endnotes
1 See Beatty and Ritter (1986), Rock (1986), Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), Brennan and
Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) for ﬁrst group of explanations. See
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1991), Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) for the second type of argument.
2 The IPO sample is limited to 1997 and earlier because the return data from the PACAP
database is available up to only 1998 and 200 trading days of after-market return data
are required to study the long-run performance of the IPOs.
3 These levels refer only to those IPOs actually included in the samples of either
McGuiness (1992) or the current study.
4 The SDC Platinum New Issues database does not provide IPO data for Hong Kong ﬁrms
prior to 1991 while the Stock Exchange Fact Books do not report offer prices for the
years 1991 through 1994. Therefore, all of the IPO data for the 1991 to 1994 period are
collected from the SDC database.
5 Note that Loughran et al (1994) gather evidence that indicates that IPO volume in
fourteen countries is positively correlated with the stock market level. They then interpret
this as evidence that private ﬁrms have some ability to time their offerings for periods
when market multiples are high. The direct hypothesis tested herein is that underpricing
is greater following a run-up in the market.
6 HSI Return  [HS Index (t)/HS Index (t  6 months)]  1.
7 Regressions using eleven individual year dummies to represent each year during the
sample period are also run. The qualitative result is virtually the same. To simplify the
presentation, the results are reported using the two period dummies.
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